



UNA - USA's
Global Classrooms:
Seoul
Learn. Live. **Lead.**

Security Council

Research Guide



UNA - USA's
Global Classrooms:
Seoul
Learn. Live. Lead.

Table of Contents

I. Committee Introduction

Agenda 1

- II.** Background
- III.** Topics of Discussion
- IV.** Previous Actions
- V.** Possible Action and Solutions
- VI.** Definition of Keywords, Affiliated Organizations and Documents
- VII.** Critical Questions
- VIII.** Bibliography

Agenda 2

- II.** Background
- III.** Topics of Discussion
- IV.** Previous Actions
- V.** Possible Action and Solutions
- VI.** Definition of Keywords, Affiliated Organizations and Documents
- VII.** Critical Questions
- VIII.** Bibliography



I. Committee Introduction

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the six main organs of the United Nations: it has 15 members with 5 permanent members and 10 non-permanent members. Five permanent countries are China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States, who were the victors of the World War II. These countries wield veto power which allows them to vote against certain resolutions that do not correspond with their national interest. Ten non-permanent member states are elected by the General Assembly with two-year terms according to the regional distribution. Under this structure, Security Council functions with the core purpose of maintaining international peace and security with responsibility. It further promotes building friendly relations between states, cooperating in solving international-level issues, and harmonizing global community with peace.

The council's power includes the establishment of peacekeeping operations and international sanctions as well as the authorization of military actions through resolutions adopted by committee meetings. Resolutions of the UNSC are typically enforced by UN peace keepers under UN peace keeping operations (PKO), military forces voluntarily provided by member states and funded independently of the main UN budget. However, these peace keepers can be sent after the approval by UN, to regions where armed conflict has recently ceased or paused to enforce the terms of peace agreements and to discourage additional combatants. The PKO's role is to be a buffer zone between the conflicting groups and to avoid future armed attacks in the region. Another action that UNSC can take to maintain or restore international peace and security under United Nations Charter is sanction measures. Sanctions take a number of different forms in pursuit of a variety of goals. The measure has ranged from comprehensive economic and trade sanctions to more targeted measures such as arms embargoes, travel bans, and financial or commodity restrictions. UNSC applies sanctions to support peaceful transitions, deter non-constitutional changes, constrain terrorism, protect human rights and promote non-proliferation. Today, there are 14 ongoing sanctions regimes which focus on supporting political settlement of conflicts, nuclear non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism. Each regime is administered by a sanction council chaired by a non-permanent member state of the UNSE. 10 monitoring groups and teams and panels are supporting the council's works, ensuring the fair and clear procedures of the adoption of resolutions.



***Veto**

Security Council grants ‘right to veto’, a designated voting power to the P5 nations. Veto usage has brought numerous international issues over the stance of the UN, as resolutions have failed even when it has obtained the minimum, nine favorable votes for the resolution. All veto usage during the conference must be within the delegates’ national stances and must be clearly justified pertaining to the practice of such action.

“Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.”

- UN Charter: Article 27



Agenda 1: The situation in the Middle East: consolidation of democracy and durable peace in the armed region

II. Background

In this year's General Assembly Security Council committee, Agenda 1 is going to be specified in the conflict of Yemen, which is the country located in the Middle East. There are few issues that need to be discussed during the sessions. Reminding our first agenda, – Yemen's consolidation of democracy and durable peace in the armed region – the word 'consolidation of democracy' means the hardening of the nation's political policies and ruling systems, and the word 'durable peace' stands for the permanent peace in Yemen and cessation of the conflicts. After the North Yemen's forced unification, the whole nation has fought regarding with the regional dissensions and internal political disorder due to the democratic movements. Since the factors of the warfare are very entangled and each actor has different interest relations by themselves, the committee need to stage the meeting in the way of systematized ways. The means should subject to the agreement of all member states that the whole process of the peace keeping and building in Yemen must aim the ultimate goal as the 'durable peace' without recurrences of the conflicts and the 'consolidation of democracy' by the stabilized government after the war. All the participants and delegates are required to keep in mind that the final target of the GC is to make an eternal peace in the armed region and set the stabilized democratic system of politics in not only the national system itself but also the whole society so that no more humanitarian crisis be occurred in Yemen.

The conflict in Yemen started in 1960s and is an ongoing war until now. Years of conflict have literally devastated not just Yemen territory but also the whole civil societies. The war left 18 million people in need of some kind of humanitarian assistance only in two years (2015-2016) and created the worst food security emergency in the world (Human Rights Watch 2016). The conflict has its roots in the failure of a regime change supposed to bring stability to Yemen following an Arab Spring uprising that forced its longtime authoritarian president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to hand over power to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, in 2011. This change of government was given rise by Yemenis, and their demand for democratic government's establishment was being powered by Jasmine Revolution. As president, Hadi struggled to deal with a variety of problems including attacks by jihadists, separatists movement in the south region, the continuing loyalty of security personnel to Saleh. And of course Hadi had to solve the problem of corruption, unemployment, food insecurity and deep-rooted tribalism among nation-wide tribes. Against Hadi and his new established government, the Houthi movement had begun. The Houthi faction is the Yemen's Zaidi Shia Muslim minority who are rebellions against president Saleh during the previous decade. Later, after the Saleh's political transition, left Saleh supporting



groups joined Houthi faction and ranged against the government and Hadi. After all, three main fronts were made, government of President Hadi, rebels of the Houthi faction and Saleh supporters, and separatists. These separatists are the people who are seeking independence for south Yemen, which was a separate country before unification with the north in 1990. They formed an alliance with troops loyal to President Hadi in 2015 to stop the Houthis capturing Aden, which made the war much complicated.

To be more specific from the beginning, the Yemen situation was practically started in 1990s, Yemeni unification. In 1990, the North and South Yemen declared their unification after South Yemen's independence from England in 1967. However, regarding with the power distributing means, both Yemens experienced friction and the North Yemen militarily unified the South by the bayonet. After the unification by force, the nation had to struggle with the internal conflicts between the north and south region and this acted as one of the factors of the later civil war after 2010s. 2010's fighting actually began in 2014 when the Houthi Shia Muslim rebel movement joined with Saleh supporters went on to take the capital Sanaa, forcing President Hadi into exile abroad. The conflict escalated dramatically in March 2015, when Saudi Arabia and eight other mostly Sunni Arab states – backed by the United States of America, United Kingdom, and France – began air strikes against the Houthis, with the declared aim of restoring Hadi's government. What happens in Yemen until now can greatly exacerbate regional tensions. It also worries the West because of the threat of attacks and terrorisms such as from al-Qaeda or IS affiliates, emanating from the country as it becomes more unstable. What makes the conflict more intricately is that the war is also seen as part of a regional power struggle between Shia-ruled Iran and Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia. Gulf Arab states, who are backers of President Hadi have accused Iran of bolstering the Houthis' rebels financially and militarily, though Iran has denied this. Yemen is also strategically important because it sits on a strait linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden, through which much of the world's oil shipments pass.

III. Topics of Discussion

A. Ending the War in Yemen

When handling the issue of solidification of democracy in Yemen and building stabilized peace in the armed region, it is important to make a multileveled approach. While the Yemen situation is related with diverse individual actors and their hostile agenda and ideology conflicts, each actors' interests should be dealt with equal attention by UNSC. This guide will provide accounts on a number of those issues, and delegates should keep these in mind and try to excogitate possible solutions to these problems, as well as consider other critical facets which might not be mentioned in this part at the same time.



Violent Extremism and Terrorism toward civilians

There are 3 front lines in Yemen civil war, which are Northern rebels (Ansar Allah, known popularly as the Houthis), Southern separatists, and Eastern terrorist groups (Al-Qaeda centered with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP). As mentioned above, separatists are the one who held movements under the reason that the Southern Yemeni are being treated discriminatingly by the central government, and their supplied economic aid by the nation is poor than the other provinces. In 2012, Southern area had rooted out the armed power related to Al-Qaeda with the support of U.S Army, but the left powers are keep committing terrors in the Eastern areas. Especially due to the Al-Qaeda's alliance with the highland regions' tribes, Eastern and Southern Yemen territories are still under the danger of terrors. The worst problem is that their terror attacks are targeting civilian areas, so innocent civilians and children are being in mortal danger of another attack. Terrorists are not one side of the rebels nor the government forces, so this made the civilians to feel much anxious because terrorist groups are spreading armed operations without distinguishing the both sides. Their sporadic terrors have made many casualties. About 1,000 Yemeni had died or damaged due to the terror attacks only aggregated in 2015 one year (UN report 2015).

Humanitarian violence and lack of aid

The UNICEF had reported that every 15 days, more than 100,000 people across Yemen are being homeless, malnourished, and dewatered due to the poor supply (UNICEEF report 2018). As the war dragged on through the number of years and far worse, due to the Cyclone Chapala made landfall on 2015, the whole nation's healthcare facilities and systems were destructed. As a result of the war and disasters, more than 10,000 preventable child deaths are being caused annually (UNICEF report 2019). To make things worse, in June 2017, a cholera epidemic resurfaced which was reported to be killing a person an hour in Yemen by June, which was a world record in one nation state. The worse is that although more and more necessity rises, the aid toward the Yemeni are decreasing. The United Nations warned that more than 12 million people will die due to the promises that are not delivered really to Yemeni. In last February at a UN conference, countries pledged 2.3 billion euros for Yemeni, but so far less than half that amount has been delivered. Without fundamental aid by neighboring countries, 2.5 million malnourished children will be cut off from life-saving services, the UN said. Out of 34 programs planned for 2019 in the purpose of helping the Yemeni, only 3 have been funded for the entire year (Deutsche Welle 2019)

Terrorist groups' attacks: Due to Yemen's geopolitical location

Yemen is located in the way that the Al-Qaeda's transfer port from Afghanistan and Iraq to



Somalia. Since the Al-Qaeda, the terrorist group's aim is to spread their influence and widen their power, the location in the middle of the passage of their transfer path cannot avoid weak security and make Al-Qaeda to covet Yemen territory as the violent terrorist group's headquarter. To make matters worse, because of the domestic situation in Yemen, the Yemeni government could not block the terrorists' trial for expanding the influence. Plus, due to the characteristic that Yemen is consisted with about 1700 tribes, the central government's control ability is actually weak except few big cities, the government cannot restrict the tribe's association with the armed groups. These circumstances has been more and more serious since the civil war proceeds, and recently, there was a movement that Islamic violent power and tribes living in mountainous areas are conspiring.

Regional power rivalry surrounding Yemen

This topic is focusing on the aspect of Saudi Arabia and Iran's hegemonic race in the level of regional conflict. After the United States of America's invasion in Iraq, Iran, which is mostly considered as Shia nation state, is struggling to get the hegemonic power in Middle East region. However, this makes another conflict with Saudi Arabia which is one of the nation states who is leading other Sunni countries in the region. Since 65% of Yemeni are the Sunni (The New York Times, 2019), Saudi Arabia could justify their conduct that they are just helping the neighboring Sunni country. As stated, Yemen civil war is also related to the denomination of religion and religious international conflict in the purpose of gaining the hegemonic powers like many other Arabic conflicts.

B. Political Development of the Region

To reason out measures to assuage the situation of Yemen, this committee needs to take a close look at how the political moves of unification have exacerbated the situation of the region. As a result, the principal issues could be categorized into the following four parts.

Political Aspects

Political aspects of North-South Yemen's consolidation moves can be divided into internal and external factors of the conflict.

A. Unification being used for strengthening political position

Yemeni politicians have shown a tendency to use unification policies as a means to strengthen their political standing during the power struggle. Therefore, even in the midst of the absence of foreign intervention, the rulers of the two South and North's territories were not actively pursuing unification policies. In the case of South Yemen, criticism rose sharply against leaders' reconciliatory attitude and position toward North Yemen. They were treated as reactionaries, divided forces, and were excluded or



relegated from the power struggle. The unification of North Yemen is in fact the type of proportional representation that reflects the stakes in national power in the formation of unified government power. Looking at the process of integration between South-North Yemen, it can be seen that North Yemen had the upper hand in national power in real terms, and took the initiative in the overall agreement and pushed for equal integration by consensus.

B. Foreign Powers

Externally, the economic and military influence of foreign powers such as the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia are remained.

Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia did not want the unification of the North-South Yemen, and thought it would be advantageous for their countries to maintain the division of Yemen.

Military Aspects

North-South Yemen have been divided for more than two decades and have repeated agreements on border disputes and principles of integration. Military integration was also influenced by this political environment, and the North and South Yemen, which had remained divided for a long time, repeated armed clashes and negotiations.

A. Military existing as a tool for political negotiations

The South-North Yemeni army has the hallmark of being a means subordinate to the ruling party in political. Just as unification was achieved by political necessity, the military had to exist as a tool for political negotiations.

B. Lack of Military Capability

Each of the North and South was not equipped with the military capability to take the initiative in pushing for the unification of the armed forces. The armies of South and North Yemen were maintained under the support provided by the former Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia, and they provided limited support to the extent that the North and South can achieve a balance. In addition, because the North and South Yemen maintained a small number of troops, they could not control the movement of the people and the border crossing of the vast.

The Influence of Neighboring Countries

There was also impact of neighboring countries that provided financial support in the process of economic integration between the two Yemens.

Iraq defeated on the Gulf War, and suspended economic aid to Yemen due to economic difficulties, while Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United States withdrew economic aid in retaliation for the Yemeni government's failure to support the coalition. As a result, external conditions and



environment were not well established to achieve economic integration for unification.

Resistance from Socialism Supporter

After becoming a republic Yemen started liberal democracy, adopted dual party system for the politics. On the economic front, the government adopted the free market economy principle, acknowledging individual rights to private ownership. On the diplomatic line, however, the two Yemens agreed to stick to the non-aligned neutral line that they were pursuing in principle as Arab states. As unification was led by North Yemen, the diplomatic line tended to lean toward the liberal camp, causing resistance from those who supported socialism.

IV. Previous Actions

2015 UN resolution

On 14 April 2015, the UNSC adopted a resolution placing sanctions on the Houthis and Saleh supporters, establishing an arms embargo on the Houthis, and calling on the Houthis to withdraw from Sana'a and other areas they seized. The Houthis condemned the UN resolution and called for mass protests. After the condemnation, the panel of experts on Yemen mandated by the Security Council, UN submitted report to the latter's president on January 2018 denouncing the UAE, the Yemeni government and the Houthis for torturing civilians in the Yemeni conflict.

2016 UN arbitration trial

In order to stop the Yemen situation, UN had been many operations by peaceful measures. One of UN's trial was 2016 arbitration. UN had made a settlement including context of the Houthi rebels' partial retreat and political power division by president Hadi. Here are some of the details. The settlement was containing the content for the Houthi rebels to retreat from their dominated regions such as Sana'a, and yield their weapons to the third party so that no more armed attacks between two happens. And for the government force, UN suggested president Hadi to appoint the new vice president and let the vice president to select next prime minister. This content means that next prime minister needs to be the one who can balance the power between the North and the South so that no more regional conflict happens between two parties. The Houthis aligned with the settlement, but president Hadi rejected the arbitration based on 2015 UN determination. 2015 UN determination was kind of a resolution that involves the clauses of the Houthis' total withdrawal and acknowledgement of president Hadi's legality. President Hadi and his government force rejected 2016 arbitration in these reason and UN's trial ended in failure.



2018 UN talks in Geneva

Due to the failure of the former arbitration trials, UN adjusted the direction from complete cessation of conflict to limited ceasefire of conflict in the level of consultation. In December 2018, UN-sponsored talks between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed government were expected to start. The UN has also started using its jets to carry wounded Houthi fighters out of the Yemeni capital, Sana'a to Oman, paving the way for planned peace talks after nearly four years of civil war. This was the result of embracing establishment plan for government force's demand, inclusive interim government and the rebels' distrust toward present administration. The resolution reflected UN's desperation to stop humanitarian damages as soon as possible.

2019 The United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA)

Following the Stockholm Agreement, reached in Sweden on 13 December 2018, between the Government of Yemen and the Houthis under the auspices of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen Martin Griffiths, the Security Council in its resolution 2451 (2018) authorized the establishment and deployment, for an initial period of 30 days, of an advance team to begin monitoring and to support the immediate implementation of the ceasefire and redeployment of forces from the city of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Saleef and Ras Isa.

It also mandated the United Nations to chair the Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) set up to oversee the ceasefire and the redeployment of forces.

On 16 January 2019, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution S/2019/2452 authorizing the establishment of a new Special Political Mission, the United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA).

V. Possible Actions and Solutions

One of the aims of this conference is to come out with the solution of Yemen conflicts and make suggestions in the aspect of international negotiations. The negotiation landscape is greatly affected by the same large forces that are reshaping all social and political relationships in the contemporary era, which are the information and communication revolution and its accompanying mass mobilization of citizens. As the report has been keep mentioned, Yemen civil war is very complicated with the diverse international actors. Since the problem roots from not only two rebels and government forces, the measure of the solution should keep in mind that all actors' interests are varying. Followings are some possible solutions for the Yemen situation, which can be the considerable outcome options.



United Nations' Arbitration

One of the most frequently used solution for the international actors' conflicts is the arbitration. Arbitration means the third party's intervention in the purpose of making the peaceful negotiation between two parties in order to solve the problem without military actions. In Yemen case, although there are USA, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Arab League and so on who are the third parties, these actors are not appropriate as an arbitrator because their interests are too tangled to each other. Like most other conflict cases, United Nations is one of the most suitable arbitrators among the actors. UN can be the proper peacemaker since the motto of the organization is not being a particular side of the conflicts. In fact, last 2016, UN made an arbitration settlement in the context of rebel's evacuation from their dominated regions, the Houthi's abandonment of their weapons to the third one, and president Hadi's new appointment of vice president and giving authority to the vice president so that he or she can set the appropriate one who can balance the South and the North Yemen's regional demands. However, due to the Hadi's opposite, the settlement had expired. Experiencing failure, this time may be the right time for UN to make better arbitration.

Military intervention by the Third Party

Despite the end of the Cold War, the use of military force in the international system is still common. Instability of the regions cause the military intervention in order to finish the conflicts. The ultimate goal of the usage of military force is to make a communication channel between two parties. Thus, the threat of military force and its use if deemed necessary, remains a requisite tool of international affairs. The use of military force can be one of the most influential and effective way to make the actors come up to the negotiation table. In Yemen case, military attacks toward the opponents are already being a problem since the 1990s. So now the measure of military force by the third party may be the effective tool that ends this prolonged conflict. However, the most important point of this method is to considerably keep neutrality so that the military action do not mean the purpose of supporting any political relation's side.

Imposing the Track-Two Diplomacy

One of the most innovative methods for building trust among negotiators is the growing use of track-two, or unofficial, diplomacy in a variety of international conflict settings (Starkey, Brigid 2018). This type of negotiation usually involves nontraditional diplomats and nontraditional settings. The strength of the track-two approach on conflict resolution is based on the idea that informal negotiations allow the parties to come together more easily to explore mutual fears, grievances and demands. Track-two diplomacy also provides the opportunity for tentative negotiation offers to be floated, policy linkages to be explored (H. Cho 2018). The reason why this type of negotiation can be one of the



effective ways to solve the problem is related to president Hadi and Saudi Arabia's pressure on him. As already mentioned, the biggest reason why UN arbitration settlement 2016 had been expired was due to president Hadi's opposite. However, this was not the decision that only president Hadi and his government made. Since the government has been aided by the Saudi-led Arab league, it is not able for Hadi to make his own decision. So in order to make real-frank talks for the Yemen peace, secret communication channel between Hadi and the Houthis can be the measure for the solution of Yemen situation.

To Mitigate Humanitarian Crisis of Yemen

The humanitarian crisis—currently the largest in the world, with 24 million people requiring assistance—remains severe. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs(UNOCHA) usually briefs on a number of key priorities to mitigate the situation, which the Council has acknowledged in several products: the protection of civilians, humanitarian access, a fully funded aid operation, support for Yemen's struggling economy and the need for a political solution.

VI. Definition of Keywords, Affiliated Organizations, and Documents

The Houthis: the rebels who are resisting against the president Hadi's government force. They fight for the balanced regional development and government's fairness.

The Southern Separatists: separatists fighters are headquartering in Aden being loyal to the Southern Transitional Council (STC), wanting to restore independence in the south.

Humanitarian violence: this contains not only lack of necessities, but also war crimes


Regional hegemonic rivalry: competition among nation states in order to be the leading country in the regional level

The Third party: actor who is not one of the main side involved in a negotiation or conflict resolution process, but who is involved in it the purpose of arbitration. For example, in the Yemen conflict, the United Nation can act as the third party in order to solve the situation, not being the supporter of the one side, not rebels nor the government force.



VII. Critical Questions

- A. What made Yemen civil war to the international proxy war?
- B. What are the main purposes of each actors? (The rebels, The government force, The Southern separatists, Al-Qaeda, IS, Saudi Arabia, Iran, USA, UN and so on)
- C. What measures can be acted by UN in order to remove violent extremism in Yemen?
- D. How can the international society work to establish measures to stabilize the internal political situation in Yemen?



VIII. Bibliography

'Al Hassan Case'. Annan, Kofi. 'QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT', Accessed 18 November 2019.

<https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-hassan/Pages/default.aspx>.

B. Starkey, Mark. A. Boyer, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld 2018, *International Negotiation in a Complex World*, New Millennium Books in International Studies, Accessed 18 November 2019.

United Nations Peacekeeping. 'United Nations Peacekeeping'. Accessed 18 November 2019.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/node>.

Yemen crisis: Why is there a war? 21 March, 2019, Accessed 18 November 2019.

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423>



Agenda 2: The Situation in Mali: Establishment of institutional normalization and security within Malian territory.**II. Background**

The landlocked area of West Africa was the core of ancient empires going back to the 4th Century. The French colonized Mali, then known as French Sudan, at the end of the 19th Century, while Islamic religious wars created theocratic states in the region. After Mali gaining independence in 1960, Mali endured decades of instability until Alpha Oumar Konaré gets elected for the president in the country's first democratic election in 1992. Mali gained independence in 1960 but endured droughts, rebellions and 23 years of military dictatorship until democratic elections in 1992. In the early 1990s, the nomadic Tuareg of the north began an insurgency over land and cultural rights.

The insurgency which is continuing till now gathered momentum in 2007, and was exacerbated by an influx of arms from the 2011 Libyan civil war. Tuareg nationalists, alongside Islamist groups with links to al-Qaeda, seized control of the north in 2012 after a military coup by soldiers frustrated by government efforts against the rebels. The fighting in the north and the establishment of a harsh form of Islamic law has forced thousands to flee their homes - some estimates say more than half the northern population has fled south or across borders into neighboring countries.

In January 2013, the Islamists captured the central city of Konna. France, responding to appeals for help from the Mali president, has sent about 550 troops to the Mopti and to Bamako, which is home to about 6,000 French nationals. French jets have also launched air strikes (Jan, 2013) against Islamist camps and mobile forces in Mali, its former colony, to stop a rebel offensive and "safeguard" Mali's existence. President François Hollande said France intended to "destroy" the Islamists or take them captive if possible. Islamists have warned that French troops will become bogged down for years. French forces have bombed rebel bases in Mali, where Islamist rebels have threatened to advance on the capital Bamako from their strongholds in the north. France said it had decided to act to stop the offensive, which could create "a terrorist state at the doorstep of France and Europe".



III. Topics of Discussion

A. Providing Justice for the Victims of Injustice

While it is easy to assume that the North, which has been the key region of unrest, are responsible for the turmoil happening in the region, one should always keep in mind the fact that the unrest largely happened due to malpractice of regionalism. There are several issues such as a disparaging gap in economy or lack of political power that can incite such violence. Delegates should keep in mind the fact that the perpetrators can also be the victim of a broken system.

Victims are at the heart of Mali's transitional justice process, aimed at shedding light on grave human rights abuses committed since Mali's independence in 1963.

And the failure to disarm thousands of combatants from Mali's 2012-2013 armed conflict, deepened a security vacuum, creating a precarious human rights climate for civilians in central and northern Mali.

Malian authorities made scant effort to investigate and hold accountable those implicated in recent abuses or those committed during the 2012-2013 armed conflict. Rule of law institutions remained weak. Corruption was endemic at all levels of government, further impeding Malians' access to basic health care and education.

Abuses by Armed Groups in North and Central Mali

Throughout 2016, armed groups linked to Al-Qaeda, opposing ethnic Tuareg and Arab groups, and government-supported militia attacked each other, Malian soldiers and neutral peacekeepers, and to a lesser extent aid workers and other civilians. The increasing presence of Islamist armed groups in central Mali generated fear and engulfed more civilians in the conflict.

Recruitment of Child Soldiers

Armed groups in the north, including those allied with the government, continued to recruit and use child soldiers. During 2016, at least seven schools in the north were at various times occupied by members of the armed groups. At least six children suspected of supporting armed groups were detained in state run detention centers, in contravention of a 2013 protocol stipulating that children were to be placed in a care center managed by the UNICEF, the UN children's rights agency.

B. Ensuring Accountability

Delegates should keep in mind that corrupt governments thrive in times of conflict. The current government in Mali is one that has not been democratically elected (HRW, 2019). The country of Mali is one of the poorest in the world. Delegates should keep the government of Mali intact even while there



is such unrest.

IV. Previous Actions

As the background section suggests, there are various groups that have been part of the peacekeeping process in Mali. The paper will look at three key international organizations in the area: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations (UN), and the African Union (AU).¹ The document will also place emphasis on the regional efforts by neighboring countries.²

The Security Council has been a catalyst for peacekeeping efforts in the region, in that its mandate created the two peacekeeping operations: the African Led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integration Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established AFISMA on December 2012, a swift action considering that the Council first started discussion on the topic earlier that year.³ Shortly thereafter, the UN deployed MINUSMA, which took on the role of AFISMA.⁴ The initial mandate was for the deployment of a 12,600 peacekeeping force, which was allowed to use ‘any means necessary’ to support the mandate.

MINUSMA was established in order to support political processes and carry out security-related tasks. Resolution 2164 ensured that MINUSMA focused on ensuring security, stabilization and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; and assisting the reestablishment of State authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in that country.

While the African Union has had several discussions in creating an initiative to assist AFISMA and MINUSMA in keeping peace in Mali, there hasn't been much notable actions by the AU. The effectiveness of MINUSMA is not clear, as it has had successes and failures. Like the majority of international operations, it has largely been unsuccessful in ending the conflict. However, MINUSMA was instrumental in leading the two parties to the 2015 Algiers Accord, which was followed by the 2018

¹ Although ECOWAS is not well mentioned in the international community, it has been a substantive force in spreading peace among its member states. Senegal, a key member state, prides itself in its capacity as a conduit of human rights and democracy. While ECOWAS has become less relevant after the disbandment of the Organization of African Unity and the Establishment of the African Union, it is still a substantive organization that carries a lot of weight and power in the region.

This paper is looking at substantive efforts by the international community in maintaining peace in the region. Therefore, by the United Nations this paper will primarily focus on the Security Council and its actions.

² The paper will not name the International Criminal Court as a significant international actor because the ICC was only permitted to investigate per the Mali's referral.

³ AFISMA was established via resolution 2085, which was adopted unanimously.

⁴ MINUSMA was established via resolution 2100, which was adopted unanimously.



Pact for Peace.

There hasn't been a cohesive effort by any party to the situation in Mali to ensure accountability from the various actors. The fact that soldiers under UN jurisdiction are called peacekeepers, not peacemakers or peacebuilders, show how much of an emphasis is on what to do after peace is kept.

Peacebuilding, of course, is under the purview of the UNPKO.⁵ According to the UNPKO page, its job is: "UN Peacekeeping helps countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. We have unique strengths, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to deploy troops and police from around the world, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to address a range of mandates set by the UN Security Council and General Assembly."

However, the reality is that actors close to the government are most often exempt from the scrutiny of international organizations, which are focused on the 'bigger problem.'

HRW reported that there were hundreds killed in 2018 due to intercommunal violence, which is under the jurisdiction of the government. Additionally, the current president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, is said to have won his second term through non-democratic means. HRW also reported that the number of human rights violations doubled in 2018 in comparison to other years. Due process was halted for several cases that were taken by the national intelligence agency. However, the organization reported that some semblance of accountability was being shown by the government.

V. Possible Actions and Solutions

A. International Efforts:

While there were concerted efforts by the international community to solve the crisis, the situation in Mali is still ongoing. Considering this, DIAS will take the liberty to suggest several possible actions and solutions.⁶

The most successful peacekeeping operations have been those that incorporate local/regional elements with international elements. The fact that MINUSMA incorporated the role of AFISMA is both encouraging and alarming.

The AU, ECOWAS, and the UN are all bureaucratic institutions. This means that there are countless steps to take when making certain actions. MINUSMA's integration of AFISMA would mean either that there is less bureaucratic steps -- since the UN is the only organization in charge -- or there are more -- since ECOWAS and the UN are involved.⁷ Making more initiatives or branches are,

⁶ The DIAS recognizes the level of biases that could be included in this section and warns the delegates to also look for their own solutions as well.

⁷ Due to the lack of data, there is no way to tell which is which.



therefore, to be approached with caution.

Instead, delegates could commission pre-existing branches or boards that were created for such events. Delegates should also remember that it is within the powers of the UNSC to recommend other organizations to take joint action, such as:

- The Secretary General's High Level Advisory Board on Mediation,
- The African Union Peace and Security Council
- ECOWAS Community Parliament⁸

B. Assisting Local Peacemaking Efforts:

International Institutions such as the United Nations keep a misguided idea that conflicts with similar core issues will be solved with similar measures. This has been proven false in the past, as every conflict are different in its unique ways. In order to tackle the core problem - which most likely have been in place for decades - delegates will have to incorporate measures that follow local traditions and cultures.

Huge international organizations such as the United Nations end up disregarding or marginalizing the effectiveness of local peacemaking methods. For example, the United Nations and the ICC marginalized the Acholi Tribe's method of peace when dealing with the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda.⁹ The International Criminal Tribunal in Rwanda utilized the local Gacaca system, which was criticized for having too much government involvement. The delegates should investigate the local traditions and governmental mechanisms in order to effectively solve the system in Mali.¹⁰

Local Issues:

Additionally, there is a communication problem with this particular part of the world, as official census puts Mali's literacy rate at 33.07%. New studies indicate that this census is misleading, since the government is unable to count Ajami literacy into official census.¹¹ Considering the local and religious nature of the conflict, the peacemaking efforts would be greatly aided by an understanding of the nature of literacy in the region. The delegates should refrain from hastily pegging the situation in Mali as a religious conflict. While this may be the case at first glance, religion is most often the cover story for conflicts, and not the root cause.

⁸ Please keep in mind that it is highly unlike the United Nations to name a specific country unless the agenda is considering said country, as the UN is an impartial organization by nature.

⁹ The Ugandan government invited the ICC to investigate the LRA. This venture discredited the ICC as a method for authoritarians to legitimize their regime, as the ICC largely turned a blind eye to the atrocities by the Ugandan government.

¹⁰ Delegates should put emphasis on such as the Sanangyuka, or 'joking relationship.'

¹¹ Ajami is a type of literacy specific to Africa regarding the localization of Arabic text into indigenous languages.



Most importantly, however, delegates should acknowledge that the situation in Mali won't be solved by writing and implementing documentations in Abuja, Addis Ababa, or New York. Peace happens in Mali with Malians accepting that a cease to violence in the best option.

International organizations are limited in that they have to be in the good graces of the host government in order to operate in their territory. In a case like Mali, there is a clear non-governmental agency that poses a serious threat to the civilian population. Therefore, it is easy for international communities to turn a blind eye on the atrocities by the government.

The guidelines that applied to the previous sub-agenda also applies in this one as well. The UNSC should not only look at international organizations for help but also local institutions. Should there not be a good environment for civil society, delegates should try to foster an environment wherein which civil society, such as watchdog organizations, can thrive in Mali.

The objectives in solving the situation in Mali is to eradicate the insurgent threat in the region. Doing so, the UNSC should also keep in mind that the mandate is to bring peace in the region, regardless of side. The UNSC should aim to fully utilize the UNPKOs in the area to serve as watchdogs against all atrocities.

The United Nations, as an impartial entity, should try to keep its mission that way. The delegates of the UNSC will be prompted to ensure that there are a limited number of entities dealing with the situation in Mali.

For such prolonged conflicts as Mali, there is also the question of what happens with politics when the threat of insurgency is gone. Political rhetoric and policy in the country has focused mainly on stopping the threat. The current president's elections were debated. The UNSC is encouraged to devise measures to ensure that the rule of law prevails even after the situation is resolved.

VI. Definition of Keywords, Affiliated Organizations, and Documents

AFISMA: African Led International Support Mission to Mali. This was an organization comprised solely of African states. While the majority of states were located in West Africa, Burundi was also part of this organizational effort

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States. Members include: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Ginea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo

Civil Society: The part of society that is governed by communities of citizens




ICC: International Criminal Court. This organization is the court of last resort: the ICC gets involved in cases wherein which the international community deems the government unfit to try a case themselves.

ICTR: International Criminal Tribunal in Rwanda. This was the precursor to the ICC

MINUSMA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. MINUSMA is the organization that is behind the peace operations in Mali.

UNPKO: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

VII. Critical Questions

- 
- A. How can the UN adopt measures that incorporate area expertise in peacebuilding?
 - B. What are local methods of seeking justice?
 - C. How can the international community restrict the communication and collaboration of terrorist organisations?
 - D. What are the ties that link terrorist organisations together?



VIII. Bibliography

Avenue, Human Rights Watch | 350 Fifth, 34th Floor | New York, and NY 10118-3299 USA | t 1.212.290.4700. 'World Report 2019: Rights Trends in Mali'. Human Rights Watch, 4 January 2019. Accessed 18 November 2019. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/mali>.

'Governance Structure | Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS)'. Accessed 18 November 2019. <https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/governance-structure/>.

countryeconomy.com. 'Mali - Literacy Rate 2015'. Accessed 18 November 2019. <https://countryeconomy.com/demography/literacy-rate/mali>.

Ginny Hill 2017, *Yemen Endures*, Oxford Univ Pr

Helen Lackner 2014, *Why Yemen Matters*, Saqi Books

NUPI. 'Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)'. NUPI.

Accessed 18 November 2019. </en/Publications/CRIStin-Pub/Assessing-the-Effectiveness-of-the-United-Nations-Mission-in-Mali-MINUSMA>

ReliefWeb. 'Memorandum on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali Emanating from the Algiers Process, Signed on 15 May and Finalized on 20 June 2015 at Bamako - Situation in January 2018 (S/2018/58) - Mali'. Accessed 18 November 2019. <https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/memorandum-implementation-agreement-peace-and-reconciliation-mali-emanating-algiers>.

'Security Council Establishes Peacekeeping Force for Mali Effective 1 July, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2100 (2013) | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases'. Accessed 18 November 2019. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10987.doc.htm>.

United Nations Peacekeeping. 'MINUSMA'. Accessed 18 November 2019. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma>.

